The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, procedural rhetoric and the military-entertainment complex: two case studies from the War on Terror. by Spokes, Matthew
Spokes, Matthew ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6456-3879 (2020) The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, procedural rhetoric and the military-
entertainment complex: two case studies from the War on Terror. 
Media, War and Conflict, 13 (2). pp. 153-169.  
Downloaded from: http://ray.yorksj.ac.uk/id/eprint/3670/
The version presented here may differ from the published version or version of record. If 
you intend to cite from the work you are advised to consult the publisher's version:
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1750635219828761
Research at York St John (RaY) is an institutional repository. It supports the principles of 
open access by making the research outputs of the University available in digital form. 
Copyright of the items stored in RaY reside with the authors and/or other copyright 
owners. Users may access full text items free of charge, and may download a copy for 
private study or non-commercial research. For further reuse terms, see licence terms 
governing individual outputs. Institutional Repository Policy Statement
RaY
Research at the University of York St John 
For more information please contact RaY at ray@yorksj.ac.uk
1 
 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, procedural rhetoric and the military-entertainment 
complex: two case studies from the War on Terror. 
 
Dr. Matthew Spokes 
School of Psychological and Social Sciences, York St. John University, York, United Kingdom 
m.spokes@yorksj.ac.uk 
School of Psychological and Social Sciences 
TW210 
York St. John University 





This article explores how the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea is represented in video 
games developed and played during the height of the War on Terror. Drawing on Šisler (2008) and 
Robinson’s (2012; 2015) work on video game rhetoric, US exceptionalism and visual typifications of 
Middle Eastern countries, the paper will explore two case studies Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell: Chaos 
Theory (2005) and Tom Clancy’s Ghost Recon 2 (2004) using Bogost’s concept of ‘procedural 
rhetoric’ (2008; 2010) to unpack and detail the visual signifiers and gameplay mechanics of these 
titles in comparison with other work on games set in ‘Axis of Evil’ countries. The paper will conclude 
by situating the games within the military-entertainment complex more broadly (here focusing on 
film), arguing that North Korea is ultimately framed paradoxically in video games, a country that is 
viewed on the one hand as a threat to world peace and on the other as an absurdist dictatorship.  
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This article explores how the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (henceforth 
North Korea) is depicted in video games developed and played during the height of the War 
on Terror (WoT). The paper will initially consider the significance of popular culture before 
exploring the idea of the ‘military-entertainment complex’. Following this, and drawing on 
Šisler (2008) and Robinson’s (2012; 2015) work on video game rhetoric, US exceptionalism 
and visual typifications of Middle Eastern countries, the paper will use content analysis to 
detail two case studies Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell: Chaos Theory (2005) and Tom Clancy’s 
Ghost Recon 2 (2004) – Splinter Cell and Ghost Recon 2 – using Bogost’s concept of 
‘procedural rhetoric’ (2008; 2010) to unpack and detail the visual signifiers and gameplay 
mechanics of these titles so as to highlight the similarities and differences between games set 
in, or featuring, countries identified at the time as being part of the ‘Axis of Evil’. The paper 
will conclude by arguing that North Korea is framed in video games as strong and weak, a 
paradoxical position which challenges a straightforward binary interpretation and suggests 
parallels with other popular cultural representations of the country from the same time, in this 
case in film. Simply put, this paper will focus on games which feature militaristic narratives 
and problematize the representation of North Korea in a way akin to Šisler’s (2008) and 
Robinson’s (2012; 2015) work on ‘digital Arabs’ and depictions of the Middle East in the 
early 2000s respectively: how might their ideas play out with regards to North Korea? The 
analytical insights that Šisler, Robinson and others have applied to video games featuring the 
Middle East will be explored to unpack the similarities and differences between their work 
and titles where North Korea is the focal point. 
It is important to highlight why engaging with video games in relation to international 
affairs might be a worthwhile endeavour. As Grayson, Davies and Philpott (2009) argue, 
popular culture is a space that facilitates, develops and challenges ideological constructions 
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and power dynamics and ‘all of these elements contribute to a terrain of ‘exchange, 
‘negotiation’, ‘resistance’ and ‘incorporation’ where the construction of the political and the 
type of politics it engenders are formed’ (155-6). In essence, popular culture enables and 
engenders debate, and not in a way that can be ‘…reduced to a superstructure that reflects a 
political base [as] visual and representation imaginaries [but] sites where politics and political 
subjectivity are constituted’ (157). Video games as one manifestation of popular culture are 
therefore vital in terms of understanding the underpinning of narratives about the social 
world, a point also advanced by Robinson in relation to fictionalized military intervention 
(2015). 
Before exploring the development of the military-entertainment complex it is worth 
thinking through the ways in which video games construct meaning and represent different 
political narratives and ideologies. Following Robinson (2012), the approach utilized in this 
paper conforms to Bogost’s (2008) view of games as ‘deliberate expressions of particular 
perspectives’ (p. 119) that are realised through the ‘possibility space’ created by different 
constraints such as the game environment and the game narrative: this is called ‘procedural 
rhetoric’ (see also Bogost 2010, Seiffert and Northaft 2015). Rather than a focus on narrative 
or play as separate entities (for a more detailed consideration of these arguments, see 
Walther, 2003; Simons, 2007; Spokes, 2017) Bogost argues that procedures play an 
important role in experiencing, comprehending and processing information related to 
gameworlds. He explains the persuasive power of games as follows: 
 
Video games can […] disrupt and change fundamental attitudes and 
beliefs about the world, leading to potentially significant long-term 
social change. I believe that this power is not equivalent to the content 
of video games, as the serious games community claims. Rather, this 
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power lies in the very way video games mount claims through 
procedural rhetorics. Thus, all kinds of video games […] possess the 
power to mount equally meaningful expression (2010: ix)   
 
How does procedural rhetoric operate? Bogost (2008: 122-4) sees video games as spaces 
where procedural models of imagined – and real – systems are developed to impose particular 
rules and processes for engagement. Through these procedural models, games reflect specific 
aspects of our experience of the world, be they material, social or cultural. Video games are 
not simply empty vessels of meaningless content but are instead spaces that make claims 
about the world which might include, pertinent to the two cases studies in this paper, 
ideology (p. 125-128) especially in relation to ‘the hidden ways of thinking that often drive 
social, political or cultural behavior (p. 128)’. Video games reflect real-world actions, 
including the ideological biases of the developers (ibid.). Procedural rhetoric moves beyond 
other forms of rhetoric – verbal, visual, textual – to consider the role of processes that 
persuade, combining the classical model of rhetoric that changes opinion or action, and a 
contemporary model for the effective conveyance of ideas (p. 125). Together, as Matheson 
outlines, playing video games allows ‘the player to model something extant in the world of 
flesh, blood, steel, and glass that exists outside the game […] Procedural rhetoric is the 
persuasive aspect of simulation’ (2015: 464).  
McAllister situates the rhetorical action of video games as intersecting with the video 
game production process more broadly, stating that games are influenced by ‘developers’ and 
marketers’ idiosyncratic, homological, and inclusive ideologies’ alongside the meaning 
gained through player interaction (2004, p31-32 cited in Robinson 2012). The implicit 
meaning and ideology that are communicated procedurally (and indeed via more traditional 
forms of visual/textual rhetoric) cannot be understood without taking into account the 
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relationship between the development of video games and the military-entertainment 
complex from which they were initially developed, and it is this I will turn to in the next 
section. 
The military-entertainment complex 
As Ottosen (2009: 123) identifies, the history of the video game runs in tandem with the 
development of the military-industrial complex, from the Cold War to the present day and a 
wide variety of games trace their origins to military simulation and training equipment. 
Following on from the notion that procedural rhetoric can reflect and impart ideology, there 
is a case to be made that the relationship between video game depictions of real-world 
conflicts and the ideological apparatus of the military can be understood as a ‘military-
entertainment complex’ (see Lenoir, 2000; Lenoir and Lowood, 2005). There are some 
necessary subtleties in terminology here with Der Derian (2009) using ‘military-industrial-
media-entertainment complex’ to reflect the role of the military in a concrete sense – for 
example this relationship between games and the military can be seen in the adapting by the 
US Marine Corps of the first-person shooter Doom in the mid-1990s (Riddell, 1997) and the 
development of multiple iterations of the training simulator America’s Army, which began 
life as a recruitment tool (Robinson 2012).   
 In the context of the titles discussed in this paper, these games were not developed 
specifically for the military, but rather function as representations of military activity, bound 
up in associated ideological and political entanglements. For instance, as Robinson (2012) 
and Poole (2004) argue, in many video games released following 9/11 - and the subsequent 
escalation of the WoT - the ‘possibility space’ in military-framed titles routinely promoted 
the idea that the principle solution to complex political problems in countries such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan is ‘through the use of force: the war on terror is only to be won by indiscriminate 
killing’ (Robinson, 2012: 510). This is where we see the sort of interconnectivity between the 
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real and the simulated that Matheson (2015) outlines. Similarly, Allen (2011) argues that this 
interconnectedness increasingly blurs the lines between entertainment and simulation, both of 
which contribute towards the cultural imagination of a militarized American cultural 
discourse (see also Hall 2000). This also ties in with Crandall’s (2005) discussion of the role 
of imperialism as a rhetorical tool and when considered in conjunction with the ideological 
role of militarization, video games can be seen as ‘a field of articulation that carries its own 
logic’ (p. 20), one that facilitates and operationalizes, through popular culture, narratives that 
simplify conflicts and forward territorialisation. 
This is further helped, in a procedural sense, through visual representation where 
military-focused video games ‘proudly transport the gamer into immersive, gut wrenching 
virtual battlefields. They persuade the gamer that, in an echo of WWII era journalism, “you 
are there” – on the beaches of Normandy, in the jungles of Vietnam, in modern military 
hotspots’ (Cowlishaw, 2005: 1). There are some exceptions to this model (see Payne, 2014; 
Payne 2016) but we can also see how the lines between the imagined and real might become 
foggier, an issue Shaw (2010) has acknowledged with regards to how the US Army use 
games as a transitional space when distinctions become blurred. Here, the two trade-off one 
another in what could be viewed as the third stage of hyperreality, where the signifier and 
significant are increasingly indistinguishable (Baudrillard, 1994). Players are able interject in 
historical events through procedural means, but cleanly, experiencing violence-without-
consequence as the player is not responsible for their actions in the gameworld (Power 2007: 
284-5). This type of engagement, Power argues, has the effect of ‘making US militarism 
appear benign’ (ibid), which may be problematic in the context of present-day fields of 
conflict in terms of how these are represented as sanitized spaces for achieving military aims 
(Gagnon 2010). However, to counter this, Reisner (2013) suggests that the sorts of player 
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agency afforded in other genres is notably curtailed in shooting-based titles, diminishing a 
player’s ability to truly connect with the sorts of historical spaces depicted. 
 Nonetheless, as Power argues (citing Woodward (2005, p.14) ‘…the digital-games 
industry enables us to pay more attention to “the small, the unremarkable, the commonplace 
things that military activities and militarism make and do”, and also offers a different point of 
entry into thinking about popular, everyday understandings of geopolitics’ (2007: 274). This 
demonstrates how the procedures and representations which govern the experience of 
military-based video games can be understood as interactions not just between player and the 
game environment, but between player and real-world geopolitics more broadly.  
North Korea in video games 
A variety of military-themed video games – spanning multiple genres - feature North Korea 
as an antagonist in largely fictionalized conflicts. These include a mixture of first and third-
person shooters, such as Battlefield 4 (DICE Los Angeles, 2013) and Rogue Warrior 
(Rebellion Developments & Zombie Studios, 2009) alongside the covert operations featured 
in the two case studies in this paper. Others involve airborne craft (Falcon 4 [MicroProse, 
1998]; Nuclear Strike [THQ, 1997]) or are tactical and strategy-based titles (for example Spec 
Ops II [Zombie Studios, 1999] and Wargame: Red Dragon (Eugen Systems, 2014). Many of 
these games predate the WoT and have been discounted in this paper as a result, though they 
do suggest some continuity in the use of North Korea as an antagonist historically. Tom 
Clancy’s Splinter Cell: Chaos Theory (Ubisoft Montreal, 2005) and Tom Clancy’s Ghost 
Recon 2 (Red Storm Entertainment, 2004) were developed and released at the height of the 
WoT and are therefore useful exemplars to explore as parallels to academic work on titles set 
in the Middle East, such as Šisler’s (2008) work on Full Spectrum Warrior and Delta Force 
and Robinson’s (2012) discussion of Army of Two amongst others. This is not to intentionally 
preclude other titles from recent years – Robinson’s (2015) work on the game Homefront 
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(THQ, 2011) is a useful touchstone – but rather to situate the two titles in relation to the 
features of the Bush Administration’s framing of the Axis of Evil (which included the DPRK) 
and contemporaneous research on games developed and consumed at the height of the WoT. 
In addition, the plots of both titles are interlinked through the sinking of the USS Clarence E. 
Walsh and both titles are prefaced by ‘Tom Clancy’ – the US author best known for his 
military-based novels - implying a strengthened relationship to an interconnected military-
entertainment complex. 
 The two case studies of Splinter Cell and Ghost Recon 2 will be unpacked in relation 
to the procedural features of each game, considering what Šisler delineates as iconographical 
features, visual signifiers, narrative structures and gameplay (2008: 205). For Splinter Cell, 
this will involve pushing at key identifiers from Šisler’s work to try to understand how North 
Korea is portrayed, and how this is similar or differs from titles that use the Middle East as a 
setting. For Ghost Recon 2, this will also involve Robinson’s (2015) discussion of US 
exceptionalism in relation to North Korea. In both cases, the methodological approach 
mirrored Šisler’s (2008) content analysis in the use of playthroughs by the researcher, 
alongside watching playthroughs of each title from other gamers hosted on YouTube so as to 
identify points of similarity and difference between gamers; this was combined with note 
taking, screencaps, recording and transcribing vocal exchanges by in-game characters and 
analysis of the flow and structure of the gameplay as well as contemporaneous games reviews 
of both titles. 
 
Splinter Cell and a paradoxical North Korea 
Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell: Chaos Theory (Ubisoft Montreal, 2005) was released in early 
2005 and was a commercial success, selling 2.5 million copies in the first three months of its 
release (Gamespot Staff, 2005). The principle avatar the player controls is Sam Fisher, a 
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covert agent who works for ‘Third Echelon’, a secret operations branch of the National 
Security Agency. Kasavin (2005) described the game as featuring a fictionalized conflict 
stemming from the ‘tenuous relationship’ between the US, North Korea and Japan’ with 
North Korea seemingly taking on the role of a ‘rogue state’. This aligns with Stahl’s (2006) 
observation that military-framed games produced during the War on Terror routinely utilise 
rhetoric consistent with US foreign policy positions at the time, situating North Korea as an 
antagonist identified as part of Bolton’s (2002) ‘Axis of Evil’. The convoluted plot involves 
North Korea being accused of sinking an American warship – the USS Clarence E. Walsh – 
which is followed by an invasion of South Korea by the North. However as the game moves 
towards its conclusion both of these events are revealed to have been orchestrated by a 
private military company called Displace International, complicating a straightforward 
reading of the country as a generic State antagonist. 
 The player is sent on a covert mission to a military facility in North Korea during the 
seventh section of the game (‘Battery’). Robinson (2012: 510) talks of the importance of the 
role of the central character/player’s avatar in guiding the use of force and in his example of 
Army of Two (set in Iraq and Afghanistan) ‘extra-military activity is justifiable [but] largely 
uncontrollable’. Splinter Cell replicates this through the use of Fisher as a lone agent 
operating through a shadowy extra-military organization allied to the NSA. 
 The procedural rhetoric of the game frames North Korea in a multitude of paradoxical 
ways. The mission begins with the player infiltrating a missile battery using night-vision 
goggles to move through the space unseen – a key dynamic that engenders trust in the ability 
of Fisher as an extra-military agent. The space is nondescript, featuring piping, metal grates 
and assorted paraphernalia such as a sack barrow. The only visual signification to situate this 
bunker from another military space is provided by a banner written in Korean. Much of the 
space continues in this format, with occasional differentiation in the use of signifiers such as 
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large North Korea flags, propaganda posters featuring North Korean soldiers on walls, and 
portraits of the North Korean leadership in officer’s rooms. These examples demonstrate the 
‘possibility space’ offered by assembling certain visual elements to situate the player in a 
specific location. This corresponds with Šisler’s discussions (2008: 205-6) on the ways in 
which ‘iconographical representations’ assist the player in their suspension of disbelief. 
However, whilst striving to convince the player of a location, Šisler also argues that ‘the in-
game surroundings and setting are rendered frequently by iteration of a limited number of 
textures and schemes’ (206) so rather than depicting an exact space, the effect is to produce a 
relatively generic arena for play, one only differentiated from others by brief representations 
of archetypal or stereotypical icons such as flags and maps. For Šisler, broad stereotyping is 
very much a feature of games set in the Middle East during the WoT – with games 
constructing ‘a “fantastical” Middle East, using quasi-historical elements in order to give…an 
oriental impression’ (2008: 207) – but in the case of North Korea this appears to be largely 
window-dressing, connected to a vague notion of what the dictatorship might represent. This 
is further compounded by the limitations of game development at the time, but equally it 
could be the product of limited information about what North Korean military installations 
look like.   
Within the Battery mission, you interact with a variety of non-player characters 
(NPCs) and these exchanges demonstrate the paradoxical strong/weak binary in 
representations of North Korea. For example, during the infiltration of the Command Room, 
Fisher interrogates several North Korean soldiers who articulate their opposition to the player 
by shouting ‘I am a loyal solider of the North Korean Army!’. Later, a mission checkpoint in 
which you strangle-hold a decorated Colonel for information is prefaced by CCTV footage of 
the Colonel killing one of his subordinates following confusion over a missile launch. The 
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North Korean military, ruthless enough to execute a man on the spot, is framed as threatening 
and committed to its position of aggression in this possibility space. 
This narrative of strength and threat is bolstered more broadly in relation to the 
overarching narrative in which the Battery mission sits. Following a subsequent missile 
launch against the warship the USS Ronald Reagan, North Korea invades the demilitarized 
zone between North and South Korea and this pre-emptive strike is attributed in the game to a 
paranoid leadership in Pyongyang. The official line taken by the US government during the 
WoT is echoed here, most famously when John Bolton described then-leader Kim Jong-Il as 
a ‘tyrannical dictator’ during a speech in Seoul in 2003 (Taylor 2018). In doing so, the 
representation of North Korea in the game parallels contemporaneous diplomacy during the 
WoT and concomitant coverage in the popular press (see Groll, 2015 on Kim Jong-Un; 
Goldman, 2011 on Kim Jong-Il), again reinforcing the connection between typifications 
across multiple forms of media. As previously discussed, Šisler (2008: 204) states that ‘the 
dominant mode of representation of Arab and Muslim cultures in European and American 
media generally exploits stereotypical generalizations and cliches’ and this appears to have 
similar currency with regards to seeing the North Korean leadership as a threat. 
However, weakness is similarly framed through NPC interactions that suggest the 
North Korean military is ridiculous and cowardly. One example of the former can be heard 
through the public-address system announcements which include ‘attention all personnel: 
tomorrow is new toothbrush day’. The function of this type of rhetoric is to belittle despotic 
power, to portray it as comedic, to demonstrate petty functionality in the management of the 
lives of North Koreans, albeit fictional NPCs. There is also an appropriate metaphor in giving 
the player the option of disabling of the PA system by shooting it, implying propaganda can 
only be challenged through violence, echoing Robinson’s (2012: 512) observation that this 
type of game is often ‘dependent on…shoot-and-destroy mechanics’ in lieu of actual 
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diplomacy. The North Korean military are further undermined in the game by having NPCs 
breaking wind at various times, accompanied by the phrase ‘Whoo! Glad no-one was around 
to smell that!’. This, when juxtaposed with the earlier observation about proud soldiers who 
are loyal to their cause, highlights the paradoxical nature of this type of representation. 
 In relation to depictions of cowardliness, this can be witnessed in the procedural 
rhetoric of one of the interrogations during the Battery level, where a soldier is so terrified of 
Fisher that he launches into a tirade against the regime, espousing his love of the US by 
drawing on popular cultural references including Britney Spears and the New York Yankees 
baseball team. Demonstrating the interconnections across the military-entertainment 
complex, this exchange is reminiscent of the scene in Saving Private Ryan (Dreamworks, 
1998) where the German solider nicknamed ‘Steamboat Willie’, fearing he is about to be 
executed by Wade’s troops, starts listing American films and sings the first line of the 
American national anthem before denouncing Hitler. These popular culture references are not 
isolated: after you obtain the abort codes to prevent the second missile attack, your operations 
officer reminds you that another missile is heading towards the USS Ronald Reagan, to 
which Fisher responds with the line ‘did you just tell me I need to win one for the Gipper’, a 
reference to the film Knute Rockne, All American (Warner Brothers, 1940) starring Ronald 
Reagan.  
 Whilst articulating some of Šisler’s (2008) arguments about stereotyping and visual 
signification, the various representations of North Korea in Splinter Cell complicates things. 
North Korea is simultaneously ridiculed, whilst being portrayed as threatening, and is 
ultimately entirely undermined when the game narrative finally shifts to reveal a private 
corporation is to blame. This leads back to McAllister’s (2004) argument that meaning in 
video games is not a straightforward designer/gamer binary, but instead rests on the 
competing ideologies of players, developers and marketeers. One explanation then is that 
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whilst the marketeers might frame the game in one way, the developers – not American, but a 
French-Canadian firm – may not necessarily adopt the model of assumed US dominance that 
is more clearly articulated in games featuring the Middle East (Šisler 2008; Robinson 2012; 
2015). The procedural rhetoric and the meaning that is subsequently conveyed becomes more 
complicated and contradictory as a result. 
 
Ghost Recon 2 and US exceptionalism 
The second case study, also published by Ubisoft, is Tom Clancy’s Ghost Recon 2 (Red 
Storm Entertainment, 2004), released on PlayStation 2 and GameCube in 2004 and 2005 
respectively. The game was also released for the Xbox but with a different plot. The focus 
here is on the former, where the USS Clarence E. Walsh (as in Splinter Cell) has been sunk 
and the titular Ghosts – a team of veteran soldiers commanded by Captain Scott Mitchell – 
are deployed behind enemy lines in North Korea to tackle the growing threat posed by 
General Jung Chong-sun, again echoing the threat posed by senior military commanders. The 
game differs from Splinter Cell (Ubisoft Montreal, 2005) in that the player takes control of 
numerous avatars depending on the type of mission that is being undertaken, as well as the 
plot differing despite featuring the same naval vessel. The game play conforms to Šisler’s 
finding that players control US or coalition forces, with enemies controlled by the 
computer/console so ‘playing for the other side is not allowed’ (2008: 207). This connects the 
central gameplay procedurally to a binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’, emphasizing the threat of the 
Other whilst engendering a sense of collective endeavour on the part of the player, 
represented by US-based extra-military forces. 
 The plot of the game is introduced via a voiceover that is used as a framing device 
through which the procedural rhetoric is developed. The way in which the game delivers your 
mission briefings is via a fictional military history programme called ‘Modern Heroes’. The 
programme is hosted by a retired Major, William Jacobs, an unlockable specialist character 
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from an earlier iteration of the Ghost franchise. Following this, the specifics of the missions 
themselves are delivered within the game world environment, with instructions offered in 
conjunction with overlaid graphics on the field of play which show the player where to go 
and which strategic goals they need to achieve. An example of this would be the airfield 
infiltration mission where different attack points are highlighted, before the camera zooms in, 
the black and white imagery is replaced by colour, and you are plunged directly into the 
action. With mission briefings using this format, the overarching narrative thread and the 
gameplay itself are closely linked together through procedural logic: you, as the player, are an 
integral part of the story.  
Furthermore, as Šisler suggests (2008) these visual cues, fonts and graphics operate as 
an effective framing device. Along with the use of a fictional studio for ‘Modern Heroes’, 
these stylistic additions operate as a call back to the sorts of historical re-enactment shows 
seen routinely on television, connecting the video game to popular culture tacitly, further 
embedding it within the military-entertainment complex. One reading of this rhetoric then is 
that it offers a level of authenticity, it represents an external referent to the sorts of 
documentaries gamers might be familiar with. It suggests to the player that the conflict they 
are about to proceed through is a memorable one, one worth immortalizing in a documentary 
(albeit a fictional one). The voiceover bolsters this relationship, with the scene-setting 
opening including a series of bombastic statements that echo contemporary film – ‘this time 
we’ve come to win a war before it even starts’ or that the player is taking the fight to ‘those 
who would seek to disrupt our way of life and that of our Allies’. This might be seen as 
demonstrating the sort of cultural overlap Ottosen (2009: 123-4) identifies where ‘the core 
components in the imagery in the video games create the same kind of illusions as in real 
wars portrayed on television’. This framing is offered alongside information about North 
Korean fragility, highlighting riots over food shortages for instance; this is analogous to the 
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March of Suffering in the mid-1990s which saw somewhere between 240,000 and 3.5 million 
North Koreans die from starvation (Spoorenberg and Schwekendiek, 2012). The effect of 
these statements is to suggest that the US is required to interject militarily, for the benefit of 
both a threatened US and the North Korean people, articulating Robinson’s contention that 
games often present intervention as the only solution to what are actually complex socio-
political problems (2012: 510).  
 Games reviews at the time articulate the supposed threat of North Korea more clearly 
whereby the country is shown to be a formidable antagonist. For example, NPC enemies are 
‘blessed with an eagle’s eyes and a surgeon’s hands that allows them to supernaturally direct 
spreads of AK [gun]fire from football fields way’ (Sulic, 2004). In a procedural sense, the 
relative difficulty of fighting against the artificial intelligence of NPCs, so Sulic suggests, 
makes the fictionalized North Korean military a legitimate challenge for the player to 
overcome. This implies a connection between an ideological discourse embedded in 
gameplay – the US against a well-trained and accurate North Korean military - and how these 
procedures were interpreted by reviewers at the time. It also chimes with Debrix’s (2008: 14) 
argument that ‘the discourse of tabloid geopolitics [is] to generate some meanings and truths 
in (inter)national politics by sensationalizing and spectacularizing world politics at all costs’ 
as in this games review, North Korea is a threat because of the precision of their soldiers. 
This can also be seen in how reviews of the game also focus on the use of actual 
military hardware. The M29 rifle from the game, which includes a mounted camera, enables 
the player to ‘systematically work through a map taking down enemies while avoiding being 
overwhelmed’ (Butts, 2004), as well as allowing you to look around corners without 
exposing your cover to the North Koreans. This piece of hardware is described in reviews of 
the game as ‘easily the coolest real world gun ever featured in a videogame’ (ibid). What this 
demonstrates is how reviewers understand the relationship between player and enemy, but 
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also how gameplay procedures suggest that obstacles – in this case artificial intelligence of 
enemy combatants – can only be overcome with military force (Robinson 2012).  
In addition, although each Ghost has specialized weaponry, the firearm players 
routinely use is the XM8 assault rifle, which, in a nifty piece of timing, was the rifle that was 
due to replace the US Army’s M4 around the same time the game was released. This weapon 
is favoured in the game because of its modular structure – so specialized add-ons can be 
applied depending on the procedural parameters of the mission – and again, reviews at the 
time directly connected this flexibility to the fact the rifle was ‘developed in concert with the 
OICW’ (Butts, 2004). In the non-virtual world, the US Army’s OICW project was 
mothballed in 2005, so the fact it features prominently in games reviews at the time implies a 
clear connection the reviewers are making between the realism of the game – enacted through 
the procedural rhetoric of military objects and interactions in the game world – and actual 
real world military developments. Not only does this further strengthen Debrix’s contention 
that the press reinforce military ideology through their discussions of popular culture (2008) 
but as Robinson (2012: 510-11) suggests, using this type of technology furthers the notion 
that force rather than negotiation is the solution, a position analogous to real-world rhetoric 
during the height of the WoT particularly ‘exceptionalism’ as foreign policy. 
There are numerous definitions of exceptionalism ranging from its construction as a 
political myth (Esch 2010), through to its legacy with regards to the Vietnam War and 
beyond (McCrisken 2003). For the purposes of this article, exceptionalism as a bedrock to the 
Bush Administration’s War on Terror against the Axis of Evil seems pertinent, and Rojecki 
(2008; see also Restad 2014) offers a useful contextualization that situates exceptionalism as 
stemming from religious and moral views with their ‘origins in Puritan piety’. Post 9/11, he 
argues, this has resulted in a shift in foreign policy towards a with-us-or-against-us ‘moral 
dimension [that] fuels religious movements that seek restoration of purity to the social order’ 
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(pg. 69). Essentially, the militaristic approach of the US was internally justified because of 
the exceptional threat to individual freedom the US faced from the Axis. Similarly, Patman 
argues that following 9/11, the Bush Administration sought to position itself as having ‘a 
unique historic responsibility in the post-cold war era to maintain unrivalled power and use it 
to spread freedom and democracy’ (2007, p.972). Robinson (2015) points out how this can be 
seen in games produced at the time. He focuses on fictionalized depictions of the Middle 
East, as Šisler (2008) does, where combatants are essentialized as ‘backward, violent and 
resistant to civil order’ (2015: 452). Countries forming the Axis are effectively the antithesis 
of the values ideologically framed by foreign policy rhetoric at the time. As previously 
demonstrated, in these games ‘there is no space for dialogue or negotiation’, just brute force 
(p.460). This ties in with Robinson and Schulzke’s arguments around ‘militarism’, something 
which can be seen both in the structural power of the military but also in the ideological 
bleed-through of military logic and ‘militaristic solutions to political problems’ (2016: 997). 
In Ghost Recon 2, as in Robinson and Šisler’s Middle Eastern examples, the implication is 
that there is only one solution to the exceptional threat posed by a well-trained North Korean 
military. 
 However, this position is somewhat destabilized through the complexity of the 
overarching narratives of both Splinter Cell and Ghost Recon 2. Although at first it appears 
these titles operate in a similar way to the broader functionality Robinson identifies in his 
titles (America’s Army and Army of Two) where the combination of procedural mechanics of 
the game and the narrative offer ‘an uncomplicated view of war and militarisation’ (2012, 
p.512), the narrative features of Splinter Cell and Ghost Recon 2 are sufficiently complicated 
so as to suggest alternative readings beyond a reductive ‘North Korea-as-threat’.  
In the case of Splinter Cell, the culpability of North Korea is questioned following the 
Battery mission, as rogue elements of Japan’s ‘Information Self Defence Force’ and a private 
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defence firm run by Fisher’s former colleague Douglas Shetland are revealed to have planted 
evidence to blame North Korea. This demonstrates the central paradox once again: whilst the 
threat of North Korea comes from the missiles they possess, they are simultaneously 
humiliated through the gameplay of the mission outlined above as well as the wider 
implication that they are the fall guys in a more complicated conspiracy.  
In Ghost Recon 2, whilst the gameplay dynamic is set exclusively in North Korea and 
involves the player exclusively killing North Korean forces, this is embedded within a 
broader narrative that is again complex. Building on the Splinter Cell narrative device of the 
missile launch, Ghost Recon 2 features a plot where the North Korean military – under the 
instruction of General Jung Chong-Sun – mobilize against the North Korean government. 
Rather than a straightforward binary standoff of the US versus North Korea, the player is 
instead situated in a story of internal conflict between institutional power bases, the result of 
which sees the Chong-Sun’s forces attacking the North Korean cities of Sinp’o and Hyesan. 
Whilst it is true that the gameplay mechanics operate in the same way as Šisler and Robinson 
outline, the overarching structure of the events the player is taking part in are more nuanced 
and harder to disentangle, leading to confusion as to who is actually at fault, and who is the 
real threat. 
 
Situating games in the military-entertainment complex 
In closing, it is important to situate these paradoxical portrayals of North Korea in video 
games as part of a wider continuum of popular culture in the military-entertainment complex 
during the WoT. As Shepherd argues (2008: 213), the WoT was routinely communicated 
using visual signifiers, and in tandem with Grayson, Davies and Philpott’s (2009) discussion 
of the interconnection between popular culture and politics, the overlaps between gaming and 
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other forms of representation can offer a more rounded understanding of the ways in which 
North Korea is represented in a paradoxical way. 
Kim (2015; 127-8) suggests that during the WoT established film franchises - where 
Western dominance is increasingly destabilized - required a new enemy and, as part of the 
Axis of Evil, North Korea might replace the earlier threat posed by the USSR. This is 
exemplified in two films released around the same time as Splinter Cell and Ghost Recon 2, 
namely Die Another Day (Eon Productions 2002) and Team America: World Police 
(Paramount Pictures 2004). The depiction of North Korea in these titles demonstrates how 
popular cultural forms in other media operate in a similar way to the video games unpacked 
here.  
As a franchise, Kim argues (2015) Bond has routinely Othered Asian characters, from 
Dr. No (Eon Productions 1962) as a ‘tragic mulatto figure’ (p. 127), through to the 
demonization of Oddjob, the unfeeling Korean henchmen par excellence in Goldfinger (Eon 
Productions 1964). In Die Another Day, the villains deliberately destabilize a straightforward 
reading of their Otherness by problematizing race as a threat: the chief antagonist in the film 
is Gustav Graves, a British billionaire who is also the gene-edited North Korean General who 
imprisons Bond at the start of the film. The effect of this, Metz argues, is a ‘post-colonial 
parody of the racial politics of these films’ (2004: 66) where whiteness is purposefully 
forwarded as the real threat. The question then becomes whether the threat is from the 
militaristic regime of North Korea or the tycoon diamond trader ‘Westernized’ through gene 
therapy? 
A seemingly obvious parody of the North Korean regime is Team America: World 
Police, a marionette-based action-comedy in which Kim Jong-Il plans to assassinate world 
leaders during a peace conference (until his plans are undone by Team America and their 
newest recruit, Broadway actor Gary Johnston). It is, however, not as clear cut as the 
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ideological West emerging victorious against a dictatorship. The film opens with Team 
America destroying tourist sites in Paris such as the Louvre and the Eiffel Tower whilst in 
pursuit of a gang of terrorists - ‘collateral damage’ is explained away by one character as 
‘bon’ because the threat was eliminated - much to the palpable horror of the assembled 
Parisian crowd. Here the problems of extra-military intervention are writ large.  
In Team America World Police, while the routine parodying of Kim Jon-Il mirrors 
aspects of the flatulent soldiers in Splinter Cell, other key facets of the military-entertainment 
complex are given similar treatment, including the nature of the threat posed by North Korea 
and the film industry itself. With regards to the latter, the stirring motivational speech by 
Team America agent Gary Johnston, in which he attempts to convince world leaders to unite 
against the common threat of Kim Jong-Il, involves describing the US as ‘reckless, arrogant, 
stupid…’. Whilst Gow (2006) has suggested that this sort of parody reinforces American 
exceptionalism by showing the reflexive nature, and therefore moral superiority, of 
contemporary military intervention it can also be argued that the film prods at US self-
righteousness. The conclusion of the film fundamentally undermines North Korea as a threat, 
when the ultimate enemy is revealed not to be a stereotypical dictator, but a gigantic 
cockroach that escapes in a spaceship.   
 The point is, in both instances, as with Splinter Cell and Ghost Recon 2, North Korea 
is shown as strong – a nuclear power, run by a ‘uber terrorist leader’ (Kim 2015: 134) hell-
bent on destruction – and weak, when undermined by the extra-military intervention of 
specialist personnel who can, for example, infiltrate a missile battery single-handedly. This 
article has sought to demonstrate, using selective examples of video games that were 
developed and played at the height of the WoT, the ways in which North Korea has been 
constructed paradoxically. Šisler’s work on ‘digital Arabs’ (2008) shows representative 
processes typifying Middle Eastern countries through particular visual signifiers, but in the 
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case of North Korea representations are less clear cut, framed through the rubric of assumed 
threats that are subsequently undermined by narrative choices in the games. Whilst the 
procedural rhetoric of military solutions is potentially reinforced through killing generic 
enemy combatants (Robinson 2012) the contradictions of a ruthless regime juxtaposed with 
differing forms of comedic belittling leaves the player ultimately confused as to what these 
representations of North Korea mean. As Bogost (2008: 125) highlights, procedural rhetoric 
in games involves processes that persuade, combining the classical model of rhetoric that 
changes opinion or action, with a contemporary model for the effective conveyance of ideas 
(p. 125), but with North Korea the understanding of what us conveyed is unclear, perhaps 
reflecting a lack of real-world comprehension of the contradictions of the country.  
The unstable position shown in these titles not only draws parallels with other forms 
of popular cultural produced at the time but is presently reflected in the changing nature of 
international relations, particularly with regards to the apparent détente between the US and 
the DPRK. In the twelve months following the inauguration of Donald Trump as the 45th 
President of the United States, the approach towards North Korea shifted from the Obama 
administration’s ‘strategic patience’ (see Choi, 2015) to extreme posturing – for example, at 
the end of April 2017, during a phone call to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Trump 
reportedly stated that ‘we can’t let a madman with nuclear weapons let on the loose like that’ 
(Nakamura and Gellman, 2017) – and back again, with the President meeting Kim Jong Un – 
a ‘pretty smart cookie’ whom he would be honoured to meet (Parker and Gearan, 2017) – in 
Singapore in June 2018. Mirroring this shift, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry initially 
described the US as ‘gangsters’ against whom ‘a series of actions tougher than they have ever 
envisaged’ will be wrought (Nichols, 2017), that the Korean People’s Army would ‘reduce 
the US mainland into ashes and darkness’ (McCurry, 2017) but then entered into an ‘era of 
no war’ with the US-allied South Korea following the inter-Korea summit in April 2018. 
22 
 
What we see then, at this latest stage of the War on Terror, are the challenges 
associated with unpicking popular cultural representations of a country, presently 
intertwining culture – in the form of procedural rhetoric in video games about North Korea – 
competing ideologies and an adapted approach to diplomacy in the Trump era. The outcome 
of this is multifaceted, and something which will require further examination as real world 
and virtual conflicts potentially overlap and become less clear-cut.  
This paper has argued for a nuanced conceptualizing of the representational North 
Korea, where the paradoxes of narrative and gameplay in titles produced during the WoT 
differs from analysis of other games set in Axis of Evil countries (Šisler, 2008; Robinson 
2012; 2015). One reading of the procedural rhetoric of Splinter Cell and Ghost Recon 2 
relates back to the effective functioning of the military-entertainment complex in reinforcing 
and disseminating ideological standpoints such as intervention based on exceptional 
circumstance, articulated through multiple cultural artefacts such as film and video games. 
Another could suggest the opposite, that games developers, to return to McAllister’s (2004) 
notion of the co-production of meaning, are actually presenting a tongue-in-cheek 
caricaturing of these positions, that the communicating of military ideology is too simplistic 
an interpretation and can be routinely undermined, as demonstrated here, through paradoxical 
procedural functions. What these differing interpretations show, in terms of what procedural 
rhetoric communicates, is the sort of reconfigured and contested understanding that is a 
necessary feature of ideology more broadly, and something that future work can explore with 
regards to challenging ontological assumptions contained within this medium (Schulzke 
2017), or how the process of Othering is resisted by those typified in these types of video 
game (Saber and Webber 2017). Ultimately, depictions of North Korea featured in games 
produced at the height of the War on Terror present the country as a contradictory and 
paradoxical unknown, rather than a simplistic portrait of threat or vulnerability.  At a time 
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when North Korea is once again framed in the news as both a potential nuclear scourge or a 
regime seeking détente with South Korea, it is important to identify that, within the military-
entertainment complex, the country has routinely been portrayed in complex and 
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